Navigating humanitarian inaction: Shifts in international discourse on Gaza and Ukraine

Abstract

This study empirically investigates how states rhetorically engage with international norms of civilian protection to mask selective humanitarian interventions in the UN General Assembly, as seen in the cases of Ukraine and Gaza. We show the selective nature of humanitarian intervention through a comparative analysis of international responses to two major ongoing crises: the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Drawing on Robert Putnam's two-level game theory, the study examines how political leaders navigate the tension between international obligations—imposed by global norms and institutions such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—and the domestic costs of taking concrete actions, such as civilian evacuations or military interventions. It argues that when states are unwilling to bear these costs, they seek a balance between maintaining a passive stance toward humanitarian crises and appearing actively engaged in civilian protection. To achieve this, states strategically shift international discourse toward more diplomatically manageable topics, such as humanitarian aid or peace talks, in order to obscure their reluctance to undertake more substantive measures. To empirically assess this phenomenon, the study conducts a qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting records from both crises. By identifying recurring themes—such as humanitarian aid, civilian evacuations, condemnations of aggressors, and calls for ceasefire—the paper demonstrates how states reframe discussions toward less contentious areas when they seek to avoid action. In contrast, the study also highlights how international discourse becomes more policy-oriented and proactive when states are willing to take concrete measures.